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Abstract
We study a simple insurance economy with moral hazard, in which random contracts
overcome the non-convexities generated by the incentive-compatibility constraints. The novelty is
that we use linear programming and duality theory to study the relation between incentive
compatibility and pricing. Using linear programming has the advantage that we can impose the
incentive-compatibility constraints on the agents that are uninformed (the insurance firms). In
contrast, most of the general equilibrium literature imposes them on the informed agents (the
consumers). We derive the two welfare theorems, establish the existence of a competitive
equilibrium, and characterize the equilibrium prices and allocations. Our competitive equilibrium
has two key properties: (i) the equilibrium prices reflect all the relevant information, including the
welfare costs arising from the incentive-compatibility constraints; (ii) the equilibrium allocations
are the same as when the incentive-compatibility constraints are imposed on the consumers.
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1 Introduction
In their pathbreaking contribution, Prescott and Townsend [20, 21] show how to ex-
tend the Arrow–Debreu model to a large class of economies with asymmetric informa-
tion. In these economies, asymmetric information is realized ex post, that is after the
agents have traded. This class includes economies with moral hazard, where agents
choose their effort after they have traded.1 In particular, Prescott and Townsend
define allocations in the space of lotteries over bundles of state–contingent commodi-
ties. They then derive the welfare theorems and show that a competitive equilibrium
exists. The key modeling choice of Prescott and Townsend is to impose the incentive–
compatibility constraints arising from asymmetric information on the consumers, and
not on the firms. This modeling choice highly simplifies the analysis and allows to
make initial progress because consumers are the informed agents and firms are the
uninformed agents. A typical example is an insurance economy with moral hazard
where consumers are subject to idiosyncratic risk. As in the full–information bench-
mark, firms supply actuarially fair insurance plans and any actuarially fair insurance
plan is budget feasible. Consumers choose from the actuarially fair insurance plans
under the incentive–compatibility constraint. As a result the second best is attained.2
The motivation for our paper is a potential conceptual problem with imposing
the incentive–compatibility constraints on the consumers: it is unclear how these
incentive–compatibility constraints are enforced in the decentralized economy. In the
standard general equilibrium model, all the relevant information is conveyed through
prices. In particular, prices reflect the costs arising from the resource constraints.
With asymmetric information, resource constraints are accompanied by incentive–
compatibility constraints. But imposing the incentive–compatibility constraints on
the consumers implies that they do not affect the equilibrium prices, as the consumers
are the informed agents. Our paper therefore takes a different approach and imposes
the incentive–compatibility constraints on the firms. We will show that the properties
of the equilibrium allocation remain unchanged. Crucially, however, the incentive–
compatibility constraints will affect the equilibrium prices and so the equilibrium
prices will reflect all the relevant information.
We make our point in a simple insurance economy with moral hazard. There is a
1However, it does not include economies with adverse selection, where agents learn their types
before they trade (ex ante asymmetric information).
2The recent work of Kehoe, Levine and Prescott [16] builds on the Prescott–Townsend approach
to study exchange economies with ex post private information about endowments. Again, the key
modeling choice is to impose the incentive–compatibility constraints on the consumers, rather than
on the firms.
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continuum of ex ante identical consumers and a finite number of idiosyncratic endow-
ment states. Each consumer can exert high or low effort at a direct utility cost. High
effort reduces the probability of ending up in a poor state. The commodities are insur-
ance contracts, which are signed between a consumer and a firm. Insurance contracts
specify a vector of state–contingent net trades and an effort level for the consumer.
We assume that net trades are perfectly verifiable and fully enforceable. It there-
fore suffices to consider exclusive contractual relations in which consumers can buy
insurance from at most one firm.3 Firms have access to a constant–returns–to–scale
insurance technology and they face both technological and incentive–compatibility
constraints. The incentive–compatibility constraints require that the contracts give
the consumers the incentives to conform to the effort specifications. We allow for
random contracts (or lotteries) to overcome the non–convexities generated by the
incentive–compatibility constraints.
The crucial insight is that with random contracts, incentive–efficient allocations
are the optimal solutions to a linear programming problem.4 To study the decen-
tralization of incentive–efficient allocations as competitive equilibria, we then pro-
ceed as follows. First, we use the primal problem, its dual, and their corresponding
complementary slackness conditions to obtain a characterization of the incentive–
efficient allocations. Second, we show that the competitive equilibrium allocation
solves the primal problem. Thus, the first welfare theorem holds. We also estab-
lish an equivalence between the competitive equilibrium prices and the solutions to
the dual problem. This equivalence allows us to derive the prices that decentralize
incentive–efficient allocations. Thus, the second welfare theorem holds. Third, the
existence of optimal solutions to the primal and dual problems directly implies the ex-
istence of a competitive equilibrium. In a companion paper (Jerez [14]), we establish
the existence of optimal solutions to the primal and dual problems.
Our application of linear programming draws heavily on the work of Makowski and
Ostroy’s [18], who develop the linear programming methodology for large economies
with full information. Specifically, they use a measure–theoretic description of the
economy to show that efficient allocations solve a linear programming problem. Then
they establish an equivalence between the competitive equilibrium allocations and
prices, on the one hand, and the solutions to the primal and dual problems, on
the other hand. Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame [10] present a similar analysis for large
3Bisin and Gottardi [3] and Bisin and Guaitoli [5] depart from this exclusive benchmark and
study moral hazard economies with non–verifiable trades. Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [6]
study environments where asymmetric information arises from the possibility of default.
4Incentive–efficient allocations are the Pareto–optimal allocations in the set of technologically
feasible and incentive–compatible allocations.
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assignment economies.
The key advantage of our methodology is that the equilibrium prices do reflect all
the relevant information because we impose the incentive–compatibility constraint on
the uninformed agents (the firms), and not on the informed agents (the consumers).
The equilibrium prices then internalize the welfare costs arising from both the tech-
nological constraints and the incentive–compatibility constraints. For example, actu-
arially fair contracts which specify a high effort generate identical technological costs
but different incentive costs. Providing more insurance implies higher incentive costs
because it raises the consumers’ incentive to shirk. This raises the equilibrium price
of an actuarially fair contract. Consumers then don’t purchase the full–insurance
contract because it is not budget feasible, and firms don’t offer it because it is not
incentive compatible (with full insurance consumers always shirk). As a result, the
competitive equilibrium allocation provides only partial insurance. Note that the
amount of insurance is then unaffected by our assumption to impose the incentive–
compatibility constraints on the firms.
There is also a formal difference between our paper and that of Prescott and
Townsend [20]. With their approach, the competitive equilibrium prices are the same
as in the full–information benchmark, so they are linear on the agents’ net trade
sets. With our approach, the competitive equilibrium prices are not the same as
in the full–information benchmark. Instead, they are non-linear on the agents’ net
trade sets. The reason is that they must internalize the welfare costs arising from
the incentive–compatibility constraints, and the welfare cost of incentives are non–
linear and may even be non–convex. Note that this feature of our model is perfectly
consistent with standard general equilibrium analysis, because prices remain linear in
the commodities, the insurance contracts.
This paper complements the work of a companion paper (Jerez [14]), in which
we used a similar methodology to study incentive–efficient allocations in economies
with adverse selection and moral hazard. We showed that, with adverse selection, the
welfare costs arising from the incentive–compatibility constraints are external. For
instance, providing more insurance to a low–risk consumer generates external incen-
tive costs because it raises the incentives of the high–risk consumers to lie about their
type.5 With moral hazard, the welfare costs arising from the incentive–compatibility
constraints are not external. For instance, providing more insurance conditional on
a high–effort specification generates incentive costs because the consumer that re-
ceives the high–effort specification has a higher incentive to shirk. Crucially, how-
5The presence of external welfare effects in economies with adverse selection is also discussed by
Bisin and Gottardi [4], Greenwald and Stiglitz [9] and Arnott, Greenwald and Stiglitz [1].
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ever, the incentives of the other consumers are unaffected. In Jerez [14] we showed
that the welfare effects arising from the incentive–compatibility constraints may be
non–convex, and so the incentive–efficient allocations may be random. We then used
linear programming and duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the
incentive–efficient allocations with adverse selection and with moral hazard.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the economy. In
Section 3 we present the general equilibrium model. In Section 4 we review the
dual characterization of the incentive–efficient allocations in Jerez [14]. In Section
5 we define a competitive equilibrium and characterize the competitive equilibrium
prices and allocations. In Section 6 derive the two welfare theorems and establish the
existence of a competitive equilibrium. In Section 7 we compare our approach with
the approach of Prescott and Townsend [20]. Section 8 concludes. The proofs are
deferred to the Appendix.
2 The Economy
There is a continuum of identical consumers with measure one and a single consump-
tion good. Consumers are subject to idiosyncratic endowment shocks. Shocks are
independent across consumers and render no aggregate uncertainty.6 Each consumer
faces S idiosyncratic states, s = 1, . . . , S. Her endowment of the consumption good in
state s is denoted by ωs, and satisfies ωs ≤ ωs′ if s < s′ (endowments are lower in lower
states). Each consumer is moreover endowed with one unit of time that she allocates
between leisure activities and effort in preventing the realization of a low state. The
effort of the consumer can be either high or low, with the set of effort levels denoted
by E = {eL, eH}, where 0 ≤ eL < eH . We denote the probability of state s with effort
ei by θis. We assume that the likelihood ratio
{
θHs
θLs
}
increases with the state s. So
high effort reduces the probability of ending up in a low state. Consumers have von
Neumann–Morgerstern preferences as defined by the utility function u : E×+ → .
The utility of consumption c under effort ei is given by Ui(c) = u(ei, c), where Ui is
6We assume that the law of large numbers holds. In the standard continuum model, where the
set of consumers is the unit interval with Lebesgue measure, it not possible to obtain non–trivial
processes of i.i.d. random endowments that yield the “exact” law of large numbers (see Judge [15]).
Thus, the standard continuum model is not a good approximation of the limit of a sequence of
large finite economies with independent shocks across consumers. Sun [23] shows that a limit model
can be constructed using hyperfinite models from non–standard analysis. The non–standard model
is asymptotically implementable in a setting with a large but finite number of agents so, in Sun’s
words, it is “elementarily equivalent” to the standard continuum model. For alternative approaches
to this problem see Feldman and Gilles [7] and Hammond and Lisboa [11].
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assumed twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave
with limc→0 U ′i(c) = ∞ and limc→∞ U ′i(c) = 0. Effort is costly, so UL(c)− UH(c) > d
for all c ∈ + and some positive constant d.
There is a finite number of firms which provide insurance services and are large
relative to the non–atomic consumers. Each firm insures a positive mass of agents,
thus facing no aggregate risk. We assume that insurance claims are perfectly verifiable
and fully enforceable. It therefore suffices to consider exclusive contractual relations
in which consumers can buy insurance from at most one firm.
The timing of the model is as follows. At some initial date, the insurance mar-
ket opens and consumers buy insurance from the firms. After the trading period,
consumers choose their effort level. Then, endowment shocks are realized. Finally,
insurance contracts are enforced, and consumption takes place. There is no ex post
trade. The structure of uncertainty is common knowledge and the realization of the
endowment shocks is observable. However, effort is private information.
3 The General Equilibrium Model
In this section, we describe the commodity space, the consumption and production
sets, and the consumers’ utility over consumption bundles. We then define allocations
and prices. We begin with some preliminary notation.
Notation
Let Z be the consumer’s net trade set, and denote its elements by z = (z1, . . . , zS):
Z =
{
z ∈ RS : zs ≥ −ωs, s = 1, . . . , S
}
.
Let C(Z) denote the space of continuous real–valued functions on Z, endowed with
the topology of uniform convergence on compact sets. The topological dual of C(Z)
is the space of signed Borel measures on Z which are finite on compact sets and have
compact support.7 We denote the dual space by Mc(Z), and let it be endowed with
the weak–star topology. Then, C(Z) is also the dual of Mc(Z). The dual pair of
spaces (C(Z),Mc(Z)) is endowed with the standard bilinear form:
〈f, µ〉 ≡
∫
Z
f(z)dµ(z), f ∈ C(Z), µ ∈Mc(Z).
Here, the bracket notation highlights the infinite dimensional nature of the spaces in
the pairing. We denote the total variation of a measure µ ∈Mc(Z) by ||µ||.
7See Hewitt [12].
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For any z ∈ Z, the expected net trade of a consumer with effort ei is
ri(z) ≡
S∑
s=1
θiszs, (3.1)
and her expected utility is
EUi(z) ≡
S∑
s=1
θisUi(ωs + zs). (3.2)
Hence, EUi, ri ∈ C(Z) for each i = L,H.
Commodities
The commodities are insurance contracts, which are signed between a consumer
and a firm. An insurance contracts specifies a vector of state–contingent net trades
and an effort level for the consumer. Both specifications are allowed to be random and
are given as follows.8 First, the consumer is assigned a lottery which specifies an effort
level. After the consumer chooses her effort and conditional on the effort specification
received, a second lottery specifies a vector of state–contingent net trades.
We take as the commodity space the product space
L =Mc(Z)×Mc(Z),
endowed with the product topology. We describe an insurance contract by a bundle
x = (xL, xH) ∈ L+ such that
||xL||+ ||xH || =
∫
Z
dxL(z) +
∫
Z
dxH(z) = 1. (3.3)
Here, ||xi|| represents the probability that the contract specifies effort ei, and the
equality in (3.3) is an adding–up condition. In addition, the probability measure
1
||xi||xi represents the random net trade assigned conditional on specification ei. Note
that the uncertainty involved in a contract resolves in two steps. In the first step,
consumers may be uncertain about the effort that the contract will specify. This
occurs when both ||xL|| and ||xH || are positive. In the second step, consumers find
out their effort specifications but, in deciding whether to conform or not to such
specifications, they may still be uncertain about the net trade that the contract will
8It is well known since the seminal work of Prescott and Townsend [20] that lotteries may play
a role in the presence of incentive–compatibility constraints. In Jerez [14] we derived conditions
under which random effort specifications and random net trades are optimal in this model. See also
Bennardo and Chiappori [2].
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specify (and thus about their state–contingent consumption plan). This occurs when
1
||xi||xi is a non–degenerate probability measure.
Remark: We could also take as the commodity space the space of compactly supported
measures over pairs of effort and net trade, Mc(E × Z). That is, we could define a
contract as a probability measure on E × Z. Since the set of effort levels E has two
elements, the two definitions of the commodity space are equivalent. Our choice of the
commodity space has the advantage that it directly implies that incentive–efficient
allocations are the optimal solutions to a linear programming problem (see Section
4). Our choice of the commodity space is also equivalent to the one of Prescott
and Townsend [20], who define the commodity space to be the space of measures over
triples of effort, consumption and endowment. The difference with respect to Prescott
and Townsend [20] is that they assume that the full–information consumption set,
and thus net trade set Z, is a finite set. With this assumption, the commodity space
is finite dimensional since it is isomorphic to the Euclidean space. We consider the
general case in which the net trade set need not be a finite set.9
Consumption Sets
The consumption set X is the set of insurance contracts:
X =
{
(xL, xH) ∈ L+ : ||xL||+ ||xH || = 1
}
. (3.4)
The exclusivity assumption implies that consumers can sign at most one contract.
Note that the consumer can always choose to be uninsured with z = 0 and exert any
effort level ei. In this case, xi = δ0 and xj = 0 for j = i (with δ0 denoting the Dirac
measure at z = 0).
Preferences
We now define the consumers’ expected utility over insurance contracts. Remem-
ber that the expected utility of a consumer with effort ei and net trade z is EUi(z),
as defined in equation (3.2). Therefore, the expected utility from contract x is10
〈EU, x〉 = 〈EUL, xL〉+ 〈EUH , xH〉 =
∫
Z
EUL(z)dxL(z) +
∫
Z
EUH(z)dxH(z). (3.5)
Since contracts are random, the consumer’s expected utility is linear in the contracts.
9See also Kehoe, Levine and Prescott [16].
10Here, EU = (EUL, EUH) ∈ C(Z)× C(Z).
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Production Sets
Each firm supplies a single insurance contract.11 We describe a production plan
by a bundle y = (yL, yH) ∈ L+. Here, (i) the probability measure 1||y||y describes
the contract supplied by the firm, and (ii) ||y|| is the total mass of contracts sup-
plied. The law of large numbers implies that, when the firm supplies a contract to a
positive mass of customers, it faces no uncertainty. We assume that the firm assigns
random contracts across customers in order to preserve this lack of uncertainty. Then
||yi|| represents the ex post mass of customers who are specified effort ei, and 1||yi||yi
represents the net trade distribution of these customers once the outcomes of their
individual random contracts are realized.
Remember that the expected net trade of a customer with effort ei and net trade
z is ri(z), as defined in equation (3.1). The net transfer of resources that the firm
makes to its customers under production plan y is then
〈rL, yL〉+ 〈rH , yH〉 =
∫
Z
rL(z)dyL(z) +
∫
Z
rH(z)dyH(z). (3.6)
A production plan y is technologically feasible if the net transfer of resources that the
firm makes to its customers is non–positive:
〈rL, yL〉+ 〈rH , yH〉 ≤ 0. (3.7)
Since the firm cannot observe the effort choice of its customers, the firm also
faces incentive–compatibility constraints. Under production plan y, the utility of a
customer who is specified effort ei and chooses effort ej is
〈EUj, yi||yi||〉 =
1
||yi||
∫
Z
EUj(z)dyi(z). (3.8)
A production plan y is incentive compatible if it is not in the interest of the customers
to deviate from their effort specifications:
〈EUi, yi〉 ≥ 〈EUj, yi〉, j = i, i, j = L,H. (3.9)
The production set Y is the set of production plans satisfying the technological
constraint and the incentive–compatibility constraints:
Y =
{
(yL, yH) ∈ L+ : 〈rL, yL〉+ 〈rH , yH〉 ≤ 0,
〈EUi − EUj, yi〉 ≥ 0, j = i, i, j = L,H
}
. (3.10)
11Since consumers are ex ante identical, we shall restrict our attention to symmetric allocations.
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Since all the constraints are linear, the production set Y displays constant returns to
scale and is convex (i.e., Y is a convex cone). Note that 0 ∈ Y , so the firm can choose
to be inactive.
Allocations, Feasible Allocations and Incentive Efficient Allocations
Since the production set displays constant returns to scale, we assume that there
is a single firm in the economy. A symmetric allocation is a consumption bundle
for the consumers and a production plan for the firm; i.e., a pair (x, y) ∈ L2. An
allocation (x, y) is feasible if it satisfies:
(a) x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , and
(b) y = x.
Condition (a) requires that the allocation be individually feasible. Condition (b)
requires that the allocation be feasible in the aggregate. That is, it requires that the
insurance contract demanded by consumers coincides with the contract supplied by
the firm, and that the mass of contracts supplied by the firm is equal to the total
mass of consumers in the economy.
An feasible allocation (x, y) is incentive efficient if there is no other feasible allo-
cation (x′, y′) that implies higher expected utility for the consumers, so 〈EU, x′〉 >
〈EU, x〉.
Prices
The price space P is set of continuous linear functionals on the commodity space
(the dual space):
P ≡ L∗ = C(Z)× C(Z),
and is endowed with the product topology. A price system is then a pair of continuous
functions on Z, and is denoted by p = (pL, pH). For a given p ∈ P , the value of a
commodity bundle x ∈ L+ is given by the inner product:
〈p, x〉 = 〈pL, xL〉+ 〈pH , xH〉 =
∫
Z
pL(z)dxL(z) +
∫
Z
pH(z)dxH(z). (3.11)
For instance, the price of a deterministic insurance contract which specifies effort ei
and net trade z is pi(z).
12 That is, prices depend both on the effort and the net trade
specified by the contract. On the other hand, a random contract specifies different
12Denote the Dirac measure at z by δz. The contract is given by xi = δz and xj = 0. Its price is:
〈p, x〉 = 〈pi, xi〉 = 〈pi, δz〉 = pi(z).
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pairs of effort and net trade with positive probability. Equation (3.11) says that
the price of a random contract is calculated by adding the values of each individual
component using the corresponding probability weights (i.e. integrating pi (z) over z
with respect to the measure xi for each ei, and summing over ei).
13
Moral Hazard versus Full Information
There are some key differences between the moral hazard model and the full–
information model of Arrow and Debreu. In the Arrow–Debreu model, the commodi-
ties are state–contingent consumption goods. The environment we study features a
single consumption good and a finite number S of idiosyncratic states. Hence, the
commodity space and the price space under full information are given by the Euclidean
space. With moral hazard, the commodities are insurance contracts. Insurance con-
tracts are rather different from state–contingent consumption goods. In the spirit of
the Arrow–Debreu model, an insurance contract specifies a state–contingent consump-
tion plan for the consumer (conditional on certain effort specifications). Crucially,
however, an insurance contract is a “package” which is indivisible. That is, agents
cannot separately buy (sell) the components of the contract. For instance, consumers
cannot separately buy units of the consumption good in state 1. Neither can agents
buy (sell) a fraction of the contract. For instance, consumers cannot buy half of a
contract. They can buy a contract or they can buy none. Each insurance contract is
then effectively a different indivisible commodity. That is, the moral hazard model
features a continuum of indivisible commodities. As a result, the commodity space
and the price space under moral hazard are infinite dimensional vector spaces.
Since two different insurance contracts are two different commodities the prices of
these contracts need not be related. For instance, take two deterministic contracts,
x1 and x2, which prescribe the same effort level ei and assign net trades z and tz (for
some t > 0 with t = 1). Their respective prices are pi(z) and pi(tz). These prices
need not be related. In particular, the price of x2 need not be t times the price of x1,
so pi(tz) = tpi(z). In other words, the function pi need not be linear. Clearly, the set
of price systems which are linear on Z is only a subset of the price space P . Note
that this feature of our model is perfectly consistent with standard general equilibrium
analysis, because prices are linear in the commodities, the insurance contracts.14 The
crucial departure from the Arrow–Debreu model is that, with exclusive contracts, the
commodity space under moral hazard (and thus the price space) is a space of higher
13See also Prescott and Townsend [20].
14Prices are (i) additive: 〈p, x1+x2〉 = 〈p, x1〉+ 〈p, x2〉 for all x1, x2 ∈ L+; and (ii) homogeneous:
〈p, tx〉 = t〈p, x〉 for all x ∈ L+ and all t ∈ +.
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dimension than under full information.15
4 A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency
In this section, we show that incentive–efficient allocations are the optimal solutions
to a linear programming problem.
The problem of the planner is to choose a feasible allocation in order to maximize
the expected utility of the consumers. The aggregate feasibility constraint y = x
can be substituted into the firm’s individual feasibility constraint y ∈ Y . The inner
product notation 〈· , ·〉 can be extended to the adding–up constraint in the definition
of the consumption set X. To this purpose we denote the characteristic function on
Z by I : Z → {0, 1} and write ||xi|| = 〈I, xi〉 for i = L,H. The problem of the
planner is to choose (xL, xH) ∈Mc(Z)×Mc(Z) to solve
(D) sup 〈EUL, xL〉+ 〈EUH , xH〉
s.t.
〈I, xL〉+ 〈I, xH〉 = 1, (4.12)
−〈EUL, xL〉+ 〈EUH , xL〉 ≤ 0, (4.13)
〈EUL, xH〉 − 〈EUH , xH〉 ≤ 0, (4.14)
〈rL, xL〉+ 〈rH , xH〉 ≤ 0, (4.15)
xL, xH ≥ 0. (4.16)
That is, the problem of the planner is to choose an insurance contract that is tech-
nologically feasible and incentive compatible and maximizes the expected utility of
the consumers. Problem (D) is a linear programming problem. Standard results in
linear programming theory show that problem (D) is dual to another linear program-
ming problem, known as the primal problem or problem (P ). Whereas problem (D)
is a maximization problem which is posed in an infinite dimensional space and has
a finite number of constraints, problem (P ) is a minimization problem which has a
finite number of variables and an infinite number of constraints. In optimization the-
ory, these kind of problems are known as Linear Semi–Infinite Programming (LSIP)
15In Jerez [14] we argue that this is a key feature of general equilibrium models with asymmetric
information and exclusive contracts. Models with asymmetric information and non–exclusive do not
have this feature (Bisin and Gottardi [3]). With non–exclusive contracts, the commodity space is
the same both under full and under asymmetric information.
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problems.16 The primal and dual problems are related because the primal variables
are also the shadow prices of the dual constraints, and vice versa.
Problem (P), which is derived in detail in the Appendix, consists of finding a
quadruple (α, βL, βH , q) ∈ R4 to solve
(P ) inf α
s.t.
α ≥ EUL(z)− qrL(z)− βL[EUH(z)− EUL(z)] ∀z ∈ Z, (4.17)
α ≥ EUH(z)− qrH(z)− βH [EUL(z)− EUH(z)] ∀z ∈ Z, (4.18)
βL, βH , q ≥ 0, (4.19)
where α is the shadow price of the adding–up constraint (4.12), βL and βH are the
shadow prices of the incentive–compatibility constraints (4.13) and (4.14), and q is
the shadow price of the technological constraint (4.15).
In Jerez [14] we have shown that problems (P ) and (D) have optimal solutions,
and that their optimal values coincide.17 We have also shown that the space of dual
variables can be restricted without loss of generality to measures with finite support.
LetMF denote the set of finitely supported measures on Z. Consider the dual problem
when (xL, xH) is restricted to lie in the space MF ×MF , and denote the restricted
problem by (DF ). The optimal values of problems (D) and (DF ) coincide.
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First–best Allocations vs. Incentive–Efficient Allocations
We now proceed to characterize the incentive–efficient allocations. Consider for a
moment the case of full information. With full information, there are no incentive–
compatibility constraints in the planner’s problem. Since uncertainty is purely idio-
syncratic, it is optimal that all consumers be fully insured and consume their expected
endowment. That is, the first–best contract implies full insurance and is actuarially
fair. If the disutility of the high effort is not too large relative to the low effort (or if
the expected endowment under high effort is sufficiently larger than under low effort),
16An LSIP problem is an optimization problem with linear objective and linear constraints in
which either number of variables or the number of constraints is finite.
17Unlike an ordinary linear programming problem, an LSIP problem need not have optimal solu-
tions when its feasible set is non–empty. Neither need the primal and dual LSIP problems have the
same optimal value, as a “positive duality gap” may occur. See Goberna and Lo´pez [8].
18Carathe`odory’s Theorem implies that it is enough to consider pairs (xL, xH) such that the union
of the supports of xL and xH has at most n + 1 elements, with n denoting the number of binding
constraints in problem (D). As we argue latter, only constraints (4.12) and (4.15) bind in problem
(D), so n = 2.
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it is optimal that all consumers provide the high effort. The problem arises because,
when effort is private information, a consumer who is fully insured will shirk when
high effort is specified. Allocations which specify high effort with positive probability
can then only provide partial insurance.
We characterize the incentive–efficient allocations by appealing to the complemen-
tary slackness theorem of linear programming (see Krabs [17, Theorem I.3.3]).
Theorem 4.1 (Complementary Slackness)
Feasible solutions (xL, xH) and (α, βL, βH , q) for problems (D) and (P ), respectively,
are optimal if and only if they satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:
q(〈rL, xL〉+ 〈rH , xH〉) = 0, (4.20)
βL(〈EUH , xL〉 − 〈EUL, xL〉) = 0, (4.21)
βH(〈EUL, xH〉 − 〈EUH , xH〉) = 0, (4.22)
α = EUL(z)− qrL(z)− βL[EUH(z)− EUL(z)] if xL(z) > 0, (4.23)
α = EUH(z)− qrH(z)− βH [EUL(z)− EUH(z)] if xH(z) > 0. (4.24)
Condition (4.20) states that the optimal shadow price q is a complementary mul-
tiplier for the technological constraint (4.15). Since the monotonicity of preferences
implies that q is positive, (4.20) implies that the aggregate net trade is zero and
thus that the incentive–efficient contract is actuarially fair. Conditions (4.21) and
(4.22) state that the optimal shadow prices βL and βH are complementary multipliers
for the incentive–compatibility constraints (4.13) and (4.14), respectively. Since the
first–best contract is not incentive compatible, the incentive–compatibility constraint
(4.14) binds with βH > 0. Hence, condition (4.22) implies that when eH is specified
the agent is indifferent between exerting effort and shirking. Since implementing a
low–effort specification is trivial, the incentive–compatibility constraint (4.13) does
not bind and βL = 0. Finally, conditions (4.23)–(4.24) state that the optimal measures
xL and xH are complementary multiplier vectors for the primal constraint systems
(4.17) and (4.18), respectively. To interpret these conditions we need to take a closer
look at the primal constraint systems.
For a given net trade z ∈ Z, the expression on the righthand side of (4.17),
EUL(z)− qrL(z), (4.25)
is the difference between consumers’ expected utility and the value of their aggregate
net trade when their effort is low. Therefore, this expression the represents the net
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contribution to social welfare when consumers are specified effort eL and net trade z.
Similarly, the expression on the righthand side of (4.18),
EUH(zH)− qrH(zH)− βH [EUL(zH)− EUH(zH)], (4.26)
represents the net contribution to social welfare when consumers are specified effort
eH and net trade z. In addition to the consumers’ expected utility and the value of
their aggregate net trade, an additional welfare effect arises when the high effort is
specified. This welfare effect is associated with the incentives of the consumers to
conform to the high–effort specification. If the net trade z is such that consumers
prefer to shirk, the welfare effect is negative and is proportional to the utility gain
from shirking. If the net trade z is such that consumers prefer not to shirk, the welfare
effect is positive and is proportional to the utility loss from shirking. If consumers are
indifferent between exerting effort and shirking, there is no welfare effect associated
with the consumer’s incentives.
The primal constraint systems (4.17) and (4.18) imply that the net contribution
to social welfare for any effort ei and any net trade z is bounded above by α. On the
other hand, the complementary slackness conditions (4.23)–(4.24) state that contract
(xL, xH) puts all the probability weight on pairs of effort and net trade for which
the net contribution to social welfare is equal to α. It thus follows that (xL, xH)
puts all the probability weight on pairs of effort and net trade that maximize the net
contribution to social welfare. The optimal shadow price α then measures the maximal
net contribution to social welfare.19
The complementary slackness conditions (4.20)–(4.24) allow to derive the proper-
ties of the incentive–efficient allocations. It is easy to verify that the net contribution
to social welfare with low effort (4.25) is a strictly concave function of z and it is
maximized when z provides full insurance. Hence, if ||xL|| > 0 then xL is degenerate
and provides full insurance (random net trade assignments are never optimal con-
ditional on a low–effort specification). The net contribution to social welfare with
high effort (4.26) is not a strictly concave function, and may have more than one
maximum. Hence, xH may be a non–degenerate measure (random net trade assign-
ments may be optimal conditional on a high–effort specification). The planner can
use random net trade assignments to exploit differences in preferences for risk with
high and low effort. If risk aversion decreases fast enough with the level of effort,
19Our notion of the maximal net contribution to social welfare for the moral–hazard economy is
the parallel of Makowski and Ostroy’s [18] notion of the conjugate or indirect utility for economies
with full information. These authors have shown how the fact that the constraints of the primal
program (the “pricing problem” in their terminology) can be incorporated into the objective function
is characteristic of the LP version of General Equilibrium.
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random net trade assignments make the deviation to low effort more costly (i.e., they
reduce the negative welfare effect of the assignment). In Jerez [14] we have shown
that, if utility is separable in consumption and effort, or if the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion does not increase with effort, the net contribution to social welfare with
high effort (4.26) is a strictly concave function. In this case, xH is degenerate and
provides partial insurance.
Random effort can also be optimal. This is the case when the maximal value
of the net contribution to social welfare with high and low effort is the same. In
Jerez [14] we have shown that random effort is optimal if the consumers’ expected
endowment is large enough, or if the disutility of effort increases fast enough with
consumption. In these instances, consumers are willing to give up some consumption
to reduce their effort. The tradeoff between consumption and effort is resolved by
allowing the consumers to provide low effort with some positive probability at the
cost of reducing their expected consumption.20
5 Competitive equilibrium
In this section, we define a competitive equilibrium. We then use linear programming
techniques to characterize the competitive equilibrium prices and allocations.
Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is defined in the standard way.
Definition 5.1 A competitive equilibrium is an allocation (x∗, y∗) ∈ L2 and a price
system p∗ ∈ L∗ such that:
(i) Consumers maximize their expected utility subject to their budget constraint:
〈EU, x∗〉 = sup
x∈X
〈EU, x〉
s.t. 〈p∗, x〉 ≤ 0.
(ii) The firm maximizes profits in the production set:
〈p∗, y∗〉 = sup
y∈Y
〈p∗, y〉.
(iii) Markets clear: x∗ = y∗.
20See also Bennardo and Chiappori [2].
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In order to characterize the competitive equilibrium prices and allocations, we
analyze the optimal decisions of the firm and the consumers. We then relate these
optimal decisions through the market clearing condition.
Optimal production plans
The firm chooses y = (yL, yH) ∈ L to solve the following linear programming
problem:
(Df ) sup 〈pL, yL〉+ 〈pH , yH〉
s.t.
−〈EUL, yL〉+ 〈EUH , yL〉 ≤ 0, (5.27)
〈EUL, yH〉 − 〈EUH , yH〉 ≤ 0, (5.28)
〈rL, yL〉+ 〈rH , yH〉 ≤ 0, (5.29)
yL, yH ≥ 0. (5.30)
Problem (Df ) is the dual of another linear programming problem. The primal pro-
blem (Pf ) consists of finding a triple (β
f
L, β
f
H , q
f ) ∈ R3 to solve
(Pf ) inf 0
s.t.
0 ≥ pL(z)− βfL(EUH (z)− EUL (z))− qfrL (z) ∀z ∈ Z, (5.31)
0 ≥ pH(z)− βfH(EUL (z)− EUH (z))− qfrH (z) ∀z ∈ Z, (5.32)
βfH , β
f
L, q
f ≥ 0, (5.33)
where (βfL, β
f
H) and q
f denote the shadow prices of the incentive–compatibility cons-
traints (5.27)–(5.28) and the technological constraint (5.29), respectively.
The fact that Y is a cone and 0 ∈ Y directly implies that an optimal production
plan yields zero profits.
Lemma 5.1 Let y be an optimal solution for problem (Df ) then
〈p, y〉 = 〈pL, yL〉+ 〈pH , yH〉 = 0.
Therefore, if an optimal solution (Df ) for problem exist, the optimal value of problem
(Df ) is zero. Any feasible solution for problem (Pf ) is optimal by definition since the
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value of problem (Pf ) is always zero. Therefore, if a feasible solution for problem (Pf )
exists, the optimal value of problem (Pf ) is also zero.
21
According to the complementary slackness theorem, feasible solutions (yL, yH) and
(βfL, β
f
H , q
f ) for problems (Df ) and (Pf ), respectively, are optimal if and only if they
satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:
qf (〈rL, yL〉+ 〈rH , yH〉) = 0, (5.34)
βfL(〈EUH , yL〉 − 〈EUL, yL〉) = 0, (5.35)
βfH(〈EUL, yH〉 − 〈EUH , yH〉) = 0, (5.36)
pL(z) = β
f
L(EUH (z)− EUL (z)) + qfrL (z) if yL(z) > 0, (5.37)
pH(z) = β
f
H(EUL (z)− EUH (z)) + qfrH (z) if yH(z) > 0. (5.38)
Conditions (5.34)–(5.36) state that the optimal shadow prices qf and (βfL, β
f
H) are
complementary multipliers for the technological constraint (5.29) and the incentive–
compatibility constraints (5.27)–(5.28), respectively. Conditions (5.37) and (5.38)
state that the optimal measures yL and yH are complementary multiplier vectors for
the primal constraint systems (5.31) and (5.32), respectively.
The expressions on the righthand side of (5.31) and (5.32),
pi(z)− qfri(z)− βfi (EUj(z)− EUi(z)), j = i, i, j = L,H. (5.39)
represent the average producer surplus from a deterministic contract that specifies
effort ei and net trade z. Suppose the contract specifies high effort. The price of the
contract is pH(z). The shadow cost of the contract is
qfrH(z) + β
f
H(EUL(z)− EUH(z)). (5.40)
The first term in (5.40) is an economic cost. Specifically, rH(z) is the average amount
of the consumption good that the firm transfers to its customers under the contract,
and qrH(z) is the shadow value of the transfer. The second term in (5.40) is an
incentive cost (benefit). If the net trade z is such that the customers prefer shirk, the
term reflects an incentive cost which is proportional to the utility gain from shirking.
If the net trade z is such that the customers prefer not to shirk, the term reflects
an incentive benefit which is proportional to the utility loss from shirking. If the
customers are indifferent between conforming to the specification and shirking, the
21If no optimal solution for problem (Df ) exists, the convention is to set the value of problem
(Df ) equal to −∞. Likewise, if no feasible solution for problem (Pf ) exists, the value of problem
(Pf ) is equal to +∞. See Krabs [17].
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term is zero (so there is no incentive cost or benefit). A similar interpretation applies
to deterministic contracts that specify low effort.22
The primal constraint systems (5.31) and (5.32) imply that the average producer
surplus from any deterministic contract is bounded above by zero. The average pro-
ducer surplus from a random contract may be calculated from expression (5.39) by
integrating, and it is also bounded above by zero.23 On the other hand, the com-
plementary slackness conditions (5.37) and (5.38) state that the optimal production
plan (yL, yH) puts all the weight on pairs of effort and net trade for which the average
producer surplus is equal to zero. It thus follows that the optimal production plan
(yL, yH) puts all the weight on pairs of effort and net trade that maximize the average
producer surplus. The maximal average producer surplus is zero.
We define the maximal average producer surplus:
π(p, βfL, β
f
H , q
f ) = sup
(ei,z)∈E×Z
{
pi(z)− qfri(z)− βfi (EUj(z)− EUi(z))
}
(5.41)
The complementary slackness conditions (5.37) and (5.38) can then be restated as
0 = π(p, βfL, β
f
H , q
f ) = pi(z)− qfri(z)− βfi (EUj(z)− EUi(z)) if yi(z) > 0, i = L,H.
(5.42)
Remark: The complementary slackness conditions (5.34)–(5.38)) that characterize
an optimal production plan can be derived using standard Lagrangian analysis. The
Lagrangian function associated with problem (Df ) is
L(y, p, βfL, βfH , qf ) =
∑
i=L,H
〈pi, yi〉 − qf
∑
i=L,H
〈ri, yi〉 −
∑
i=L,H; j =i
βfi 〈EUj − EUi, yi〉
=
∑
i=L,H; j =i
∫
Z
(
pi (z)− qfri (z)− βfi (EUj (z)− EUi (z))
)
dyi(z).
(5.43)
The Lagrangian function (5.43) represents the total producer surplus under produc-
tion plan y.
22The first welfare theorem (see Section 6) implies that the incentive–compatibility constraint
with low effort will not bind in a competitive equilibrium. In equilibrium, the shadow cost of a
low–effort contract will then be the standard economic cost: qfrL(z). On the other hand, the
incentive–compatibility constraint with high effort will bind with βfH > 0. Hence, the shadow cost
a high–effort contract, as specified in (5.40), will not be a convex function of z.
23The average producer surplus from a random contract (xL, xH) is
∑
i∈{L,H}
∫
Z
(
pi(z)− qfri(z)− βfi (EUj(z)− EUi(z)
)
dxi.
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A feasible production plan y is optimal if and only if there exists there exists
a triple (βfL, β
f
H , q
f ) ∈ R3+ such that βfL, βfH and qf are respective complementary
multipliers for constraints (5.27), (5.28) and (5.29), and y maximizes the Lagrangian
function on L. Note that the Lagrangian function in (5.43) is maximized when y puts
all the weight on pairs of effort and net trade that maximize the function inside the
integral, and thus attain the maximal average producer surplus.
Optimal consumption plans
The consumer chooses x = (xL, xH) ∈ L to solve the following linear programming
problem:
(Dc) sup 〈EUL, xL〉+ 〈EUH , xH〉
s.t.
〈I, xL〉+ 〈I, xH〉 = 1, (5.44)
〈pL, xL〉+ 〈pH , xL〉 ≤ 0, (5.45)
xL, xH ≥ 0. (5.46)
The budget constraint (5.45) says that the value the contract chosen by the consumer
must be non–positive. Since contracts are lotteries over pairs of effort and net trades,
constraint (5.45) is analogous to the full–information budget constraint, according to
which the value of the consumer’s net trade must be non–positive.
The primal problem (Pc) consists of finding a pair (α
c, λ) ∈ R2 to solve
(Pc) inf α
c
s.t.
αc ≥ EUL(z)− λpL(z) ∀z ∈ Z, (5.47)
αc ≥ EUH(z)− λpH(z) ∀z ∈ Z, (5.48)
λ ≥ 0, (5.49)
where αc and λ are the shadow prices of the adding–up constraint (5.44) and the
budget constraint (5.45).
Throughout the section we assume that optimal solutions for problems (Dc) and
(Pc) exist and that the optimal values of these problems are identical. An analogous
argument to the one used in Jerez [14] implies that problems (Dc) and (Pc) have
these properties if the price system p satisfies certain conditions. The competitive
equilibrium price system derived at the end of this section satisfies these conditions.
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By the complementary slackness theorem, feasible solutions (xL, xH) and (α
c, λ)
for problems (Dc) and (Pc), respectively, are optimal if and only if they satisfy the
complementary slackness conditions:
λ(〈pL, xL〉+ 〈pH , xH〉) = 0, (5.50)
αc = EUL(z)− λpL(z) if xL(z) > 0, (5.51)
αc = EUH(z)− λpH(z) if xH(z) > 0. (5.52)
Condition (5.50) states that the optimal shadow price λ is a complementary mul-
tiplier for the budget constraint (5.45). The monotonicity of preferences implies that
λ is positive, so the budget constraint holds with strict equality.24 Conditions (5.51)
and (5.52) state that the optimal measures xL and xH are complementary multiplier
vectors for the primal constraint systems (5.47) and (5.48). The expression on the
righthand side of (5.47) and (4.18),
EUi (z)− λpi (z) , (5.53)
represents the expected consumer surplus from a deterministic contract that specifies
effort ei and net trade z. The primal constraint systems (5.47) and (5.48) imply that
the expected consumer surplus from any deterministic contract is bounded above
by αc. The expected consumer surplus from a random contract may be calculated
from expression (5.39) by integrating, and it is also bounded above by αc. The
complementary slackness conditions (5.51) and (5.52) state that the consumption
plan (xL, xH) puts all the probability weight on pairs of effort and net trade for
which the expected consumer surplus is equal to αc. It thus follows that an optimal
consumption plan (xL, xH) puts all the probability weight on pairs of effort and net
trade that attain the maximal expected consumer surplus. This maximal surplus is
equal to αc.
We define the maximal expected consumer surplus:
v(p, λ) = sup
(ei,z)∈E×Z
{EUi(z)− λpi(z)} . (5.54)
The complementary slackness conditions (5.51) and (5.52) can then be expressed as
αc = v(p, λ) = EUi(z)− λpi(z) if xi(z) > 0, i = L,H. (5.55)
24Suppose λ were zero. If Ui is unbounded on Z for some i ∈ {L,H}, the righthand side of
the corresponding primal constraint system is unbounded on Z, so αc cannot be finite. But then
problems (Dc) and (Pc) cannot have the same optimal value (since the value of problem (Dc) is
finite). If Ui is bounded for i = L,H, the corresponding primal constraint system cannot hold with
strict equality for any z ∈ Z, so the support of xL and xH is empty (remember that Ui is strictly
increasing). But then problem (Dc) cannot have an optimal solution.
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Since the values of problems (Dc) and (Pc) are identical, the consumer’s indirect
utility is equal to the maximal expected consumer surplus αc.
Remark: The complementary slackness conditions (5.50)–(5.52) can also be derived
using Lagrangian analysis. The Lagrangian function associated with problem (Dc) is
L(x, λ) =
∑
i=L,H
〈EUi, xi〉 − λ
∑
i=L,H
〈pi, xi〉+ αc(1−
∑
i=L,H
〈I, xi〉)
=
∑
i=L,H
∫
Z
(EUi(z)− λpi(z)) dxi(z) + αc
(
1−
∑
i=L,H
∫
Z
dxi(z)
)
.(5.56)
Any contract x ∈ X satisfies the adding–up condition, so the last term in (5.56)
always vanishes. For any x ∈ X, the Lagrangian function (5.56) represents the
expected consumer surplus under contract x.
A budget feasible contract x is optimal if and only if there exists λ ∈ R+ such that
λ is a complementary multiplier for the budget constraint (5.45), and x maximizes the
Lagrangian function on L. Note that the Lagrangian function in (5.56) is maximized
when x puts all the probability weight on pairs of effort and net trade that maximize
the expected consumer surplus.
Competitive Equilibrium Prices and Allocations
The competitive equilibrium prices and allocations can be characterized by com-
bining the complementary slackness conditions for the problems of the firm and the
consumer, (5.34)–(5.38) and (5.50)–(5.52), and the market clearing condition.
The complementary slackness conditions for the firm’s problem imply that the
price of the contract offered by the firm is equal to the shadow cost of the contract.
This result is analogous to the standard constant–returns condition that the price of
a good is equal to its marginal cost of production. Let x∗ be the contract traded in a
competitive equilibrium. The complementary slackness conditions (5.37) and (5.38)
for the firm’s problem together with the market clearing condition imply that, for
any pair (ei, z) specified with positive probability by contract x
∗,
p∗i (z) = q
f∗ri(z) + β
f∗
i (EUj(z)− EUi(z)). (5.57)
Here, qf∗, βf∗L and β
f∗
L are the optimal shadow prices in the firm’s problem in a
competitive equilibrium. Hence, the price of contract x∗ is
〈p∗, x∗〉 = 〈p∗L, x∗L〉+ 〈p∗H , x∗H〉, (5.58)
where
〈p∗i , x∗i 〉 = 〈qf∗ri − βf∗i (EUj − EUi), x∗i 〉. (5.59)
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That is, the price of the contract traded in a competitive equilibrium is equal to its
shadow cost. Equation (5.59), combined with the complementary slackness conditions
(5.34)–(5.36) for the firm’s problem and the market clearing condition, moreover
implies that
〈p∗, x∗〉 = 0. (5.60)
That is, the price of the contract traded in a competitive equilibrium is equal to zero
(i.e., the value of the expected net trade implied by the contract is zero).25
Unlike the standard Arrow–Debreu model, the competitive equilibrium price sys-
tem is not fully determined under moral hazard. This is a standard feature of mod-
els with a continuum of commodities, where the prices of commodities that are not
traded in equilibrium are indeterminate.26 In these infinite dimensional models, there
are many price systems that support a competitive equilibrium allocation. We have
already noted that, for any pair (ei, z) ∈ E × Z:
p∗i (z) ≤ qf∗ri(z) + βf∗i (EUj(z)− EUi(z)). (5.61)
That is, the producer surplus is non–positive. The price of a contract x that is not
traded in a competitive equilibrium must satisfy
〈p∗, x〉 = 〈p∗L, xL〉+ 〈p∗H , xH〉, (5.62)
where
〈p∗i , xi〉 ≤ 〈qf∗ri − βf∗i (EUj − EUi), xi〉. (5.63)
The price of contracts that are not traded in a competitive equilibrium are then lower
that the shadow cost of these contracts. If this was not the case, the firm could make
infinite profits by supplying an infinite amount of one of these contracts.
A competitive equilibrium price system may be selected by taking the supremum
over the set of prices p ∈ P that satisfy conditions (5.57) and (5.61). The selected
price system is27
p∗i (z) = q
f∗ri(z) + β
f
i∗(EUj(z)− EUi(z)) ∀z ∈ Z, i = L,H.
Under this price selection criterion, the price of a contract (whether traded or not)
is equal to its shadow cost. This ensures that no small perturbation of an optimal
production plan yields negative profits to the firm.
25Note that this result also follows from the zero profit result in Lemma 5.1 and the market
clearing condition.
26See Mas–Colell and Zame [19].
27Under this price selection criterion, the equilibrium prices lie in a subset of the price space
P that is isomorphic to 3. An equilibrium price system is then fully characterized by a triple
(βf∗L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗) ∈ 3+.
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Crucially, in addition to the competitive equilibrium prices, we may characterize
a competitive equilibrium allocation. The characterization is obtained by combining
the complementary slackness conditions for the firm’s problem (5.34)–(5.38), with
the complementary slackness conditions for the consumer’s problem (5.50)–(5.52),
and the market clearing condition.
Proposition 5.1 The allocation (x∗, y∗) is a competitive equilibrium allocation if and
only if (x∗, y∗) is a feasible, and there exist (α∗c , β
f∗
L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗) ∈ R4+ and λ∗ > 0 such
that
qf∗(〈rL, x∗L〉+ 〈rH , x∗H〉) = 0; (5.64)
βf∗L (〈EUH , x∗L〉 − 〈EUL, x∗L〉) = 0, (5.65)
β∗H(〈EUL, x∗H〉 − 〈EUH , x∗H〉) = 0, (5.66)
α∗c ≥ EUL(z)− λ∗qf∗rL(z)− λ∗βf∗L (EUH(z)− EUL(z)) ∀z ∈ Z,
with equality if x∗L(z) > 0, (5.67)
α∗c ≥ EUH(z)− λ∗qf∗rH(z)− λ∗βf∗H (EUL(z)− EUH(z)) ∀z ∈ Z,
with equality if x∗H(z) > 0. (5.68)
Substituting the market clearing condition y∗ = x∗ into the firm’s complementary
slackness conditions (5.34)–(5.36) gives (5.64)–(5.66). Substituting the remaining
complementary slackness conditions in the firm’s problem, (5.37)–(5.38), into the con-
sumer’s complementary slackness conditions (5.51)–(5.52) gives (5.67)–(5.68). Note
that the complementary slackness condition (5.50), which is associated to the con-
sumer’s budget constraint, is not included in the characterization in the competitive
equilibrium allocation. The reason is that condition (5.50) is redundant. We have
already shown that the price of the contract traded in a competitive equilibrium is
zero (equation (5.60)). This result implies that the budget constraint binds. The
proposition states that conditions (5.64)–(5.68) are not only necessary but also suffi-
cient for x∗ to be the contract traded in a competitive equilibrium. The proof of the
“if” statement is in the Appendix.
The key result of this paper is that the characterization of a competitive equi-
librium allocation is equivalent to the characterization of an incentive–efficient allo-
cation in Section 4. Since the marginal utility of money λ∗ is strictly positive, the
conditions that characterize a competitive equilibrium allocation, (5.64)–(5.68), can
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be restated as
q∗(〈rL, x∗L〉+ 〈rH , x∗H〉) = 0; (5.69)
β∗L(〈EUH , x∗L〉 − 〈EUL, x∗L〉) = 0, (5.70)
β∗H(〈EUL, xH〉 − 〈EUH , xH〉) = 0, (5.71)
α∗c ≥ EUL(z)− q∗rL(z)− β∗L(EUH(z)− EUL(z)) ∀z ∈ Z,
with equality if x∗L(z) > 0, (5.72)
α∗c ≥ EUH(z)− q∗rH(z)− β∗H(EUL(z)− EUH(z)) ∀z ∈ Z,
with equality if x∗H(z) > 0. (5.73)
where q∗ = λ∗qf∗, β∗L = λ
∗βf∗L , and β
∗
H = λ
∗βf∗H .
28 Crucially, conditions (5.69)–(5.73)
are the complementary slackness conditions that characterize an incentive efficient
allocations, (4.20)–(4.24). This implies that an allocation is a competitive equilibrium
allocation if and only if it is incentive efficient. Thus, the two welfare theorems hold.
6 Welfare Theorems and Existence
The welfare theorems stem directly from Propositions 4.1 and 5.1.
Theorem 6.1
(i) (First Welfare Theorem) Suppose (x∗, y∗, p∗) is a competitive equilibrium. Let
(βf∗L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗) and (α∗c , λ
∗) be the optimal shadow prices in the problem of the
firm and the consumer, respectively. Since λ∗ represents the marginal utility
of money, the optimal shadow prices in the firm’s problem can be measured in
utils:
(β∗L, β
∗
H , q
∗) = λ∗
(
βf∗L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗
)
.
Then x∗ and (α∗c , β
∗
L, β
∗
H , q
∗) are optimal solutions for problems (D) and (P),
respectively.
(ii) (Second Welfare Theorem) Suppose x and (α, βL, βH , q) are optimal solutions
for problems (D) and (P), respectively. Let y = x and define p = (pL, pH) with
pi(z) = qri(z) + βi(EUj(z)− EUi(z)) ∀z ∈ Z; i = L,H.
Then (x, y, p) is a competitive equilibrium. Also, α is the consumers’ indirect
utility in a competitive equilibrium.
28Equivalently, we may normalize utilities so that the marginal utility of money is one, and set
λ∗ = 1.
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The first part of the theorem says that the competitive equilibrium allocation
solves the planner’s problem (D). It also says that there is an equivalence between the
optimal shadow prices in the problem of the firm and the consumer and the solutions
to the primal problem (P ). Since the price of a traded contract is equal to the shadow
cost of the contract, this implies that there is an equivalence between the competitive
equilibrium price system and the optimal solutions to the primal problem (P ). The
second part of the theorem says that any optimal solution to the planner’s problem
(D) can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium allocation. It also says that
there is an equivalence between the optimal solutions to the primal problem (P ) and
the price system that decentralizes the incentive–efficient allocation. In particular,
with the price selection criterion in Section 5, there is a one–to–one correspondence
between the prices that decentralize the incentive–efficient allocation and the optimal
solutions to the problem (P ).
The result in Theorem 6.1 is parallel to the general result obtained by Makowski
and Ostroy’s [18] for large economies with full information. Makowski and Ostroy
use the measure–theoretic description of the full–information economy to show that
efficient allocations solve a linear programming problem. They then establish an
equivalence between the competitive equilibrium allocations and prices, on the one
hand, and the solutions to the primal and dual problems, on the other hand. Theorem
6.1 extends Makowski and Ostroy’s result to an economy with moral hazard.
The first welfare theorem can also be derived using standard arguments. We
provide the proof for completeness.
Theorem 6.2 (First Welfare Theorem) A competitive equilibrium allocation is in-
centive efficient.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. That is, there is (x′, y′) ∈ L2, with x′ ∈ X, y′ ∈
Y, x′ = y′, and 〈EU, x′〉 > 〈EU, x∗〉. The consumer’s optimization condition (i)
in Definition 5.1 then implies 〈p∗, x′〉 > 〈p∗, x∗〉. By feasibility, this is equivalent to
〈p∗, y′〉 > 〈p∗, y∗〉 = 0, which contradicts the firm’s optimization condition (ii). 
The existence of optimal solutions to the primal and dual problems directly implies
the existence of a competitive equilibrium. In Jerez [14], we have established the
existence of optimal solutions to the primal and dual problems.
Theorem 6.3 A competitive equilibrium exists.
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7 Comparison with Prescott and Townsend
In this section, we compare our analysis to that of Prescott and Townsend [20].
The key modeling choice of Prescott and Townsend is to impose the incentive–
compatibility constraints on the consumers, and not on the firms. This modeling
choice highly simplifies the analysis because consumers are the informed agents. The
presence of the incentive–compatibility constraints on the set of admissible consump-
tion plans is interpreted as a restriction on the set of contracts that can be traded in
equilibrium.29
Suppose that we impose the incentive–compatibility constraints on the consumers,
and not on the firms. In this case, the production set is the set of production plans
that are technologically feasible:
Y =
{
(yL, yH) ∈ L+ : 〈rL, yL〉+ 〈rH , yH〉 ≤ 0
}
. (7.74)
The production plans that are technologically feasible are those that are (at least)
actuarially fair. This is similar to the full–information benchmark, where the state–
contingent plans that are technologically feasible are those that are (at least) actuar-
ially fair. The main difference with respect to the full information benchmark is that
firms do not sell state–contingent goods separately. They sell packages, or contracts.
A second difference is that contracts may be random.
As in Prescott and Townsend [20], we assume that the consumption set under
full information, and thus the net trade set Z, is a finite set. With this simplifying
assumption, the commodity space and the price space are given by the Euclidean
space. The firm’s problem is then a standard linear programming problem, since all
the integrals can be replaced with finite sums.30 The firm chooses a production plan
y ∈ Y to maximize profits. The first–order conditions for the firm’s problem are:
pi(z) = q
fri(z) ∀z ∈ Z, i = L,H, (7.75)
where qf is the optimal shadow price of the technological constraint. Condition (7.75)
implies that the price of a contract must be equal to its economic cost. Following
Prescott and Townsend, we normalize prices by setting qf = 1:
p∗i (z) = ri(z) ∀z ∈ Z, i = L,H. (7.76)
The only candidate for a competitive equilibrium price system (up to some arbitrary
normalization) is then the “actuarially fair” price system.31
29See Kehoe, Levine and Prescott [16].
30The same is true for the problem of the planner and the consumer.
31If the net trade set Z is not finite, the price of a traded contract must be actuarially fair. The
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When the incentive–compatibility constraints are imposed on the consumers, the
consumer’s problem becomes:
sup(xL,xH)∈L 〈EUL, xL〉+ 〈EUH , xH〉
s.t.
〈I, xL〉+ 〈I, xH〉 = 1, (7.77)
−〈EUL, xL〉+ 〈EUH , xL〉 ≤ 0, (7.78)
〈EUL, xH〉 − 〈EUH , xH〉 ≤ 0, (7.79)
〈pL, xL〉+ 〈pH , xH〉 ≤ 0, (7.80)
xL, xH ≥ 0. (7.81)
That is, the consumer chooses a contract that is incentive compatible and budget
feasible in order to maximize utility. Crucially, when the equilibrium price system
(7.76) is substituted in the consumer’s problem, this problem coincides with the
planner’s problem. The consumers choose from the actuarially fair insurance plans
under the incentive–compatibility constraint, so the second best is attained. Thus,
the first welfare theorem holds. Note that any incentive–efficient allocation can be
decentralized as a competitive equilibrium allocation at the actuarially fair prices in
(7.76). Thus, the second welfare theorem also holds.
The main difference between our competitive equilibrium notion and that of
Prescott and Townsend is that, in our model, all the relevant information is conveyed
through the price system. The equilibrium prices reflects all the relevant informa-
tion, including the welfare costs arising from the incentive–compatibility constraints,
because we impose these constraints on the firms. In a competitive equilibrium, the
price of a contract that induces the consumers to shirk (not to shirk) is above (be-
low) the actuarially fair price. The price of a contract that makes the consumers
indifferent between providing the high effort and shirking is actuarially fair. This
is the case of the contract traded in a competitive equilibrium. This contract is
incentive efficient and it provides only partial insurance. Note that the amount of
insurance is then unaffected by our assumption to impose the incentive–compatibility
price of non–traded contract is indeterminate and cannot be higher than the actuarially fair price.
In a similar environment with ex post private information, Kehoe, Levine and Prescott [16] show
that prices can be restricted without loss of generality to be linear on Z. With this restriction, prices
are always actuarially fair, as in the full–information benchmark. This restriction is equivalent to
our price selection criterion in the case where the firm does not face the incentive–compatibility
constraints (i.e., the supremum of the set of competitive equilibrium prices is the actuarially fair
price system in (7.76).
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constraints on the firms. That is, the equilibrium allocations are the same as when
the incentive–compatibility constraints are imposed on the consumers.
There is also a formal difference between our paper and that of Prescott and
Townsend [20]. With their approach, the competitive equilibrium prices are the same
as in the full–information benchmark, so they are linear on the agents’ net trade
sets. With our approach, the competitive equilibrium prices are not the same as
in the full–information benchmark. Instead, they are non-linear on the agents’ net
trade sets. The reason is that they must internalize the welfare costs arising from
the incentive–compatibility constraints, and the welfare cost of incentives are non-
linear and may even be non-convex. Note that this feature of our model is perfectly
consistent with standard general equilibrium analysis, because prices remain linear in
the commodities, the insurance contracts.
Our results are related to recent work on adverse selection. Bisin and Gottardi [4]
study a simple adverse selection economy. Their key insight is to model the economy
as one with externalities in consumption. This is possible because the consumption
plan of each risk type affects the set of admissible plans of the other types. Following
Prescott and Townsend [20], the authors impose the incentive–compatibility con-
straints on the consumers. They show that a competitive equilibrium exists and the
two welfare theorems hold if there is an appropriate enlarged set of markets which
includes markets for consumption rights. They also show that a competitive equili-
brium exists but need not be incentive efficient if markets for consumption rights are
not available. Rustichini and Siconolfi [22] study a class of economies with adverse
selection. They analyze two notions of competitive equilibrium: strong and weak
equilibrium. In a strong equilibrium, the incentive–compatibility constraints are im-
posed on the firms. In a weak equilibrium, the incentive–compatibility constraints are
feasibility constraints on the allocation (just like the standard resource constraints),
and are neither imposed on the consumers nor on the firms. Rustichini and Siconolfi
show that strong equilibria are incentive efficient but may fail to exist. In indepen-
dent work (Jerez [13]), we have studied a similar notion of equilibrium with these
same properties. By contrast, Rustichini and Siconolfi also show that weak equilibria
always exist but they are indeterminate and need not be incentive efficient. They also
show that the set of equilibrium allocations (both weak and strong) does not change
if the incentive–compatibility constraints are also imposed on the consumers.
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8 Conclusion
We have studied a simple insurance economy with moral hazard, in which random con-
tracts overcome the non–convexities generated by the incentive–compatibility cons-
traints. The novelty is that we have used linear programming and duality theory to
study the relation between incentive compatibility and pricing. Using linear program-
ming has the advantage that we have been able to impose the incentive–compatibility
constraints on the agents that face the informational asymmetries (the firms). This
is in contrast to the seminal paper of Prescott and Townsend [20] who imposed them
on the informed agents (the consumers). We have derived the two welfare theorems,
established the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and characterized the equi-
librium prices and allocations. Our competitive equilibrium has two key properties:
(i) the equilibrium prices reflect all the relevant information, including the welfare
costs arising from the incentive–compatibility constraints; (ii) the equilibrium allo-
cations are the same as when the incentive–compatibility constraints are imposed on
the consumers.
In closely related work, Bennardo and Chiappori [2] also study an insurance econo-
my with moral hazard. The main difference between their paper and our paper is
that we follow a general equilibrium approach and describe the trading process as a
Walrasian market. In contrast, they follow a game–theoretic approach and describe
the trading process as a two–stage game. In the first stage, firms simultaneously
offer insurance contracts under the incentive–compatibility constraints. In the second
stage, consumers choose from the set of contracts offered by the firms. Bennardo and
Chiappori define a “Bertrand equilibrium” as a Nash equilibrium of the two–stage
game. They also show that a Bertrand equilibrium exists and is incentive efficient.
One may therefore think of our notion of competitive equilibrium as being a reduced
form of Bennardo and Chiappori’s Bertrand equilibrium. Note that there is another
difference between the two papers: while we only consider idiosyncratic risk, Bennardo
and Chiappori [2] consider both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. We could easily
extend our results to an environment with both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk.
Restricting our attention to idiosyncratic risk therefore is purely for convenience.
The question remains whether we may apply the approach of this paper also to
economies with adverse selection. In these economies, the presence of external welfare
costs arising from the incentive–compatibility constraints makes the decentralization
of incentive–efficient allocations problematic. In a companion paper (Jerez [13]),
we show that our approach can in principle be extended to economies with adverse
selection. We study a simple economy with adverse selection and present a notion
of competitive equilibrium that imposes the incentive–compatibility constraints on
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the firms (see also Rustichini and Siconolfi [22]). Applying the linear programming
methodology of the present paper, we show that a competitive equilibrium is incentive
efficient but may fail to exist. While Jerez [13] is just a first step towards applying
the linear programming methodology to study economies with adverse selection, it
suggests that this methodology can be helpful in understanding the problems which
arise in decentralizing incentive–efficient allocations.
Appendix A
A.1 The Linear Semi–Infinite Programming Problems
In this section, we set up the primal LSIP problem and derive its dual. The LSIP
problems in Sections 4 and 5 obtain as particular cases of the problems in this section
by applying the definitions in Table I.
A.1.1 The Primal Problem
Let 1 ≤ m ≤ n and n be equipped with the Euclidean norm and partially ordered
by means of the cone
Knm = { y ∈ n : yj ≥ 0, j = 1, ...,m}.
Let ω ∈ 2+ and define Z = { z ∈ 2 : z ≥ −ω }. Let C(Z) denote the vector space
of continuous real–valued functions on Z, endowed with the topology of uniform
convergence on compact sets and partially ordered by means of the cone
C+(Z) = { f ∈ C(Z) : f(z) ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ Z }.
The primal problem is to find y ∈ n to solve
(P ) inf c · y
s.t. Ay ≥ b,
y ∈ Knm,
where c ∈ n, b = (bL, bH) ∈ C(Z) × C(Z), and A : n → C(Z) × C(Z) is a
continuous linear mapping. Problem (P ) is linear and has n unknowns and infinitely
many constraints.
A.1.2 The Dual Problem
Let Mc(Z) denote the space of signed Borel measures on Z which have compact
support and are finite on compact sets. This space is the topological dual space of
C(Z) (Hewitt [12]).
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The Planner The Firm The Consumer
(n,m) (4, 3) (3,3) (2,1)
y (βL, βH , q, α) (β
f
L, β
f
H , q
f ) (λ, αc)
c (0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0) (0, 1)
b = (bL, bH) (EUL, EUH) (pL, pH) (EUL, EUH)
f1 = (f1L, f1H) (−EUL + EUH , 0) (−EUL + EUH , 0) (pL, pH)
f2 = (f2L, f2H) (0, EUL − EUH) (0, EUL − EUH) (I, I)
f3 = (f3L, f3H) (rL, rH) (rL, rH) —–
f4 = (f4L, f4H) (I, I) —– —–
Table I: The Primal and Dual Problems in Sections 4 and 5
Let C(Z)× C(Z) be paired in duality with Mc(Z)×Mc(Z). The reflexive space
n is paired with itself. The two pairings are endowed with their natural bilinear
forms (to highlight the dimensionality of the spaces in the pairing we use the dot
product and bracket notation for finite and infinite dimensions, respectively):
〈f, x〉 =
∫
Z
fLdxL +
∫
Z
fHdxH , f = (fL, fH) ∈ C(Z)× C(Z),
x = (xL, xH) ∈Mc(Z)×Mc(Z);
y · z =
n∑
j=1
yjzj, y ∈ n, z ∈ n.
The adjoint of A, A∗ :Mc(Z)×Mc(Z)→ n, is defined by the relation
y · (A∗x) = 〈Ay, x〉, for all y ∈ Knm, x ∈Mc+(Z)×Mc+(Z). (A.1)
We may write Ay =
∑n
j=1 yjfj, where fj = (fjL, fjH) ∈ C(Z)×C(Z) for j = 1, · · · , n.
Then (A.1) can be expressed as
y · (A∗x) =
n∑
j=1
yj〈fj, x〉, for all y ∈ Knm, x ∈Mc+(Z)×Mc+(Z). (A.2)
Write A∗x ≤ c as
n∑
j=1
yj(〈fj, x〉 − cj) ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ Knm.
The dual problem is to find x ∈Mc(Z)×Mc(Z) to solve
(D) sup 〈b, x〉
s.t. 〈fj, x〉 ≤ cj, j = 1, ...,m,
〈fj, x〉 = cj, j = m+ 1, ..., n,
x ≥ 0.
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Problem (D) is a linear programming problem with infinitely many unknowns and n
constraints.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6.1
(a) The “if” statement.
Let (x∗, y∗) be a competitive equilibrium allocation. Since x∗ ∈ X and y∗ ∈ Y
and x∗ = y∗, the allocation is feasible. Let (βf∗L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗) and (α∗c , λ
∗) denote
the optimal shadow prices in the firm’s problem and the consumer’s problem,
respectively. We now that βf∗L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗, α∗c ≥ 0 and λ∗ > 0. Substituting y∗ = x∗
into the firm’s complementary slackness conditions (5.34)–(5.36) gives (5.64)–
(5.66). Substituting the remaining complementary slackness conditions in the
firm’s problem as stated in (5.42) into the consumer’s complementary slackness
conditions as stated in (5.55) gives (5.67)–(5.68).
(b) The “only if” statement.
Suppose (x∗, y∗) is feasible and there exist (α∗c , β
f∗
L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗) ∈ R4+ and λ∗ > 0
such that (5.64)–(5.68) hold. Since x∗ is a feasible consumption plan, y∗ is a
feasible consumption plan, and y∗ = x∗, it remains to show that contract x∗ is
both an optimal consumption plan and an optimal production plan for some
choice of the price system. Let the price system be given by
p∗i (z) = q
f∗ri(z) + β
f∗
i (EUi(z)− EUi(z)), i = L,H. (A.3)
At these prices, (βf∗L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗) is a feasible solution for problem (Df ). Moreover,
conditions (A.3), and (5.64)–(5.66) are the complementary slackness conditions
in the firm’s problem. Thus, xf∗ and (βf∗L , β
f∗
H , q
f∗) are optimal solutions for
problems (Df ) and (Pf ), respectively. Note also that 〈p∗, x∗〉 = 0.
Substituting the price system (A.3) in the consumer’s problem implies that
(α∗c , λ
∗) is feasible for (Pc) since (5.67) and (5.68) hold. Moreover, conditions
(5.67) and (5.68) are the last two complementary slackness conditions in the
consumer’s problem. Also, since 〈p∗, x∗〉 = 0, the first complementary slackness
condition in the consumer’s problem also holds (since the budget constraint
binds). Thus, x∗ and (α∗c , λ
∗) are optimal solutions for problems (Dc) and (Pc),
respectively.
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